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A PATIENT’S RIGHT NOT TO HEAR: 
 
THE PUBLIC HEALTH CASE FOR 
CHALLENGING PRE-ABORTION ULTRASOUND 
DESCRIPTION MANDATES BY REFOCUSING 
ON THE LISTENER  
 
Juliana Shulman-Laniel, MPH* 
I. INTRODUCTION    
On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled on its first major 
abortion case in nearly a decade: Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt.1 In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court reiterated and 
expanded upon the “undue burden” standard first established by 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.2  In doing so, the Court provided 
further guidance on how to interpret state laws that regulate abortion 
access. While the Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health has 
major implications for many state regulations concerning abortion 
providers, the Court’s holding left unanswered a number of critical 
questions. In particular, lower courts and scholars must still grapple 
with how to analyze the wide range of abortion-specific informed 
consent laws that women must face prior to obtaining abortion 
care, 3  including state laws that require women to undergo pre-
                                                
* J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, expected May 2017; M.P.H., 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2015; B.A., University 
of Chicago, 2009. Many thanks to my advisor, Professor Wendy Parmet, for 
her guidance and support throughout the process of writing this article. 
1 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
2 Id. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
878 (1992)). 
3 See generally GUTTMACHER INST., State Laws and Policies: An Overview 
of Abortion Laws (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws (describing the myriad of state laws 
that may restrict a woman’s access to abortion services). 
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abortion ultrasounds that further require physicians to provide 
descriptions of the fetus.4  
Most of the challenges to these ultrasound description 
mandates, in both legal literature and in the courts, have focused on 
the First Amendment rights of physicians and other health 
professionals who must provide ultrasound descriptions to a woman 
seeking an abortion.5 Courts and scholars have consistently asked 
whether health professionals have a First Amendment right against 
compelled speech, and if so, whether informed consent ultrasound 
laws violate this right.6 Surprisingly little attention has been paid, 
however, to the question of whether patients who are required to 
hear a pre-abortion ultrasound description may have a right against 
“compelled listening.”7  
This Note analyzes that question and proposes a different 
approach. Rather than attempting to strike down these laws by 
navigating the abstruse arena of compelled professional speech or 
by grasping to demonstrate an “undue burden” where one may not 
exist, public health lawyers and advocates should instead focus on 
the rights of the listener, and in particular, move towards 
recognition of a woman’s right not to hear. Part II of this Note 
provides background on the legal landscape of abortion-specific 
informed consent and the legal approaches that have been taken to 
challenge restrictive state laws. Part III then explores how the ever-
evolving First Amendment rhetoric and doctrine around 
                                                
4  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D) (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(C) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
253.10(3g)(2) (West 2016). 
5 See, e.g., Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Maloney, Casey and a Woman’s 
Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 595 (2012); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A 
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, U. ILL. L. REV. 
939 (2007); Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in 
Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22 (2015); Ian 
Vanderwalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling 
Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 
(2012). 
6 See, e.g., Gaylord & Maloney, supra note 5; Post, supra note 5. 
7  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against 
Compelled Listening, 89 BOS. U. L. REV 939, 966 (2009); see also Suter, 
supra note 5, at 38. 
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professional speech may support the notion of a patient’s right not 
to hear. This section also describes how the captive-audience 
doctrine can be used to bolster this right for women who are 
required to withstand compelled speech within the intimacy of an 
abortion clinic, and how the content of emotionally intrusive 
information affects this right. Part IV discusses how the current 
discourse surrounding ultrasound descriptions in the health 
professional’s right against compelled speech may ultimately be 
dangerous for public health and for the states’ continuing need to 
regulate the practice of medicine. Additionally, Part IV argues that 
re-framing the debate to focus on the patient’s right not to hear and 
away from the physician’s right not to speak is therefore critical, not 
only to challenging the restrictive laws that hinder women’s access 
to abortion care, but also to protecting the vital legal mechanisms of 
informed consent and of public health law more broadly.  
 
II.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR ULTRASOUND DESCRIPTION 
MANDATES  
 
At present,8 women in thirty-eight states live in jurisdictions 
with abortion-specific informed consent requirements. 9  This 
                                                
8 This Note was published in May 2017. All research is current up to this date 
unless otherwise indicated.  
9  GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting 
Periods for Abortion (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf 
[hereinafter State Counseling Policies]. There have also been attempts to 
enact similar legislation at the federal level. Most recently, on January 22, 
2015, the Ultrasound Informed Consent Act was introduced to Congress. The 
bill has since sat in the Subcommittee on Health. Similar to many of the state 
laws, the bill provides that a woman may look away from the required 
ultrasound, but the bill is notably silent on whether a woman may refuse to 
listen to the explanation of the ultrasound’s depictions. H.R. 492, 114th Cong. 
(2015). Additionally, some of these state requirements may, in effect, require 
the particularly intrusive procedure of a transvaginal ultrasound, particular for 
the vast majority of women who seek abortions in the early stages of 
pregnancy. See Jessica Silbey, Picturing Moral Arguments in a Fraught Legal 
Arena: Fetuses, Photographic Phantoms and Ultrasounds, 16 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 6 n.10 (2015) (“The transvaginal ultrasound is a common 
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includes twelve states that require a woman to receive counseling 
about the “ability of a fetus to feel pain,” six states “that require that 
the woman be told that personhood begins at conception,” and five 
states that require a woman to receive information “inaccurately 
assert[ing] a link between abortion and an increased risk of breast 
cancer.”10  
Among these abortion-specific informed consent 
requirements, as of March 2016, women who seek abortions in 
thirteen states are first required to have an ultrasound.11 In ten out 
of thirteen of these states, the woman must be “offered” the 
“opportunity to view the [ultrasound] image,” and may be offered 
the opportunity to hear the fetal heartbeat or to hear a detailed 
description of the fetus, its gestational age, and more. In these ten 
states, while the ultrasound is mandatory for most women, the 
woman is not required to hear a doctor’s description of the fetus or 
to view the ultrasound image.12 However, women who currently 
seek abortions in three states – Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin – 
are required by law to not only have an ultrasound prior to giving 
informed consent, but also required to hear a verbal description of 
the fetus during the ultrasound procedure.13 
These ultrasound mandates – often called Women’s Right to 
Know Acts14 or “speech and display” laws15 – are passed under the 
                                                
procedure for early-stage pregnancies, but like all pregnancy-related 
treatment, it is voluntary for women. When requesting an abortion, the 
mandatory nature of an ultrasound, coupled with the fact that early-stage 
pregnancy ultrasounds are most often conducted transvaginally, makes the 
requirement of the ultrasound all that more invasive.”). 
10 State Counseling Policies, supra note 9. 
11 GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound 
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. 
12 Id. (See chart providing explanations for ultrasound requirements by state.  
Specifically, “[i]n Virginia and Wisconsin a woman who has been sexually 
assaulted is not required to undergo the ultrasound.”). 
13 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D) (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(c) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
253.10(3g)(2) (West 2016). 
14 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.001 (West 2003). 
15 Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 1289, 1311 
(2015).  
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guise of informed consent, premised on the notion that, without the 
description conveyed during an ultrasound, women are not fully 
informed about their abortion procedure.16 However, the laws in 
Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin, where a clinician is required to 
describe the fetus during the ultrasound, arguably represent a 
dangerous departure from the common law of informed consent by 
not allowing women to decline the description.17 In other words, 
women are not able to determine for themselves what information 
is material – or not – to their consent or to refuse information the 
state has deemed relevant to their decision-making.   
For example, Louisiana law requires all women to have an 
ultrasound “at least twenty-four hours” prior to any abortion 
procedure.18 The law articulates that the clinician must “display the 
screen which depicts the active ultrasound images so that the 
pregnant woman may view them” and “make audible the fetal 
heartbeat.”19 However, the woman is not required to listen to the 
fetal heartbeat or to view the ultrasound image.20 In contrast, the law 
does specify that women are required to listen to a simultaneous 
“oral explanation” of the fetus, including the “presence and location 
of the unborn child,” “the dimensions of the unborn child,” and the 
“presence of cardiac activity.”21 Prior to the ultrasound, the woman 
                                                
16 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and 
the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 351 (2008). 
17 For example, in Texas and Louisiana, women can decline the description 
under limited circumstances, such as to abort a pregnancy following sexual 
assault or rape if the woman first reports the assault to law enforcement. LA. 
§ 40:1061.10(D)(6)(e) (Westlaw); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.022(d)(1) 
(West 2011). 
18 LA. § 40:1061.10(D)(2). 
19 Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. §§ 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a)-(b). The law does provide the opportunity for 
“[p]regnant rape survivors or victims of crime against nature . . . who have 
reported the act to law enforcement officials” to opt-out of this oral 
description.  Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(e). However, given that one must first 
report the rape or other crime to law enforcement officials, one might suspect 
that few women who are obtaining an abortion after having experienced rape 
or other trauma would be able to certify to the state that they fall within this 
limited exception. 
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must sign a state-created consent form, certifying that she 
understands that she is “required by law to hear an oral explanation 
of the ultrasound images.”22 
Notably, throughout the Louisiana statute, the law frames all 
of these requirements in terms of a woman’s positive rights. The 
informed consent form states: 
 
During this ultrasound examination, you have 
the right to an oral explanation of the results. You 
have the option to view the images on 
the ultrasound screen . . . You have the right to 
receive answers to any questions you ask about your 
ultrasound examination. You have the right to 
receive an ultrasound photographic print, which will 
be provided at your request.23  
 
This framing of the state’s requirements as a woman’s “options” 
conforms to the notion that these laws enhance informed consent 
and patient autonomy. Certainly, this framing conforms to the 
rhetoric put forth by the legislature that these laws are intended to 
“allow the patient to evaluate her condition and render her best 
decision under difficult circumstances.”24 Yet, this framing of a 
woman’s positive right to hear may also potentially open the door 
to the notion that the corollary right should also exist – a right not 
to hear – based on the same premise that a patient should be 
“[allowed]  . . . to evaluate her condition and render her best 
decision,” 25  which may include refusing specific information 
during her decision-making process.26 
Despite a great deal of attention focused on abortion-specific 
informed consent laws, the constitutionality of mandatory 
                                                
22 Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(d). 
23 Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(e). 
24 2012 La. Acts 685. 
25 Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
579 (5th Cir. 2012). 
26 Corbin, supra note 7, at 955. 
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ultrasound description laws remains unclear. 27  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health did not touch upon a 
First Amendment analysis, as informed consent laws were not 
raised by the Texas regulations in question. What Whole Woman’s 
Health does provide for this discussion, however, is additional 
guidance for how state abortion regulations should be interpreted by 
the courts under the evolving “undue burden” standard.28  
By striking down Texas’ so-called Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Provider (“TRAP”) laws,29 Whole Woman’s Health marks 
only the second time the Supreme Court has interpreted abortion 
regulations that predominantly use a “woman-protective 
rationale.”30 As a result, its holding may have broad implications for 
how to apply the “undue burden” standard and interpret the validity 
of legislation that uses this type of “protective” rationale in the 
future. As Justice Breyer described in his opinion, “[t]he rule 
announced in Casey, . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a 
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits these laws 
                                                
27 See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 2838 (2015); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013); but see Texas Med. Providers Performing 
Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 2012). 
28 See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) 
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).  
29 See generally Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain 
Political Traction While Abortion Clinics — And the Women They Serve—
Pay the Price, 16 No. 2 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7, (Spring 2013) 
(describing the rise of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”) 
laws that place onerous restrictions on abortion facilities and providers in the 
name of protecting women).  
30 Arguably, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) also analyzed a law 
predominantly based on “woman-protective” grounds, although the purported 
protective purpose at issue in Carhart – which focused on the potential 
psychological harm to women if the “partial birth abortion” ban were lifted – 
is not as central to the case as the protective purpose was in Whole Woman’s 
Health.  See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 29. See also Reva B. Siegel, The New 
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007) (describing the development of 
“women-protective rationales” in abortion regulation.) 
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confer.”31 He goes on to do just that, examining not only the ample 
evidence that Texas’ regulations “place[d] a substantial obstacle in 
the path of women seeking a previability abortion,”32 but also the 
distinct lack of evidence to support Texas’ assertion that these 
regulations would improve women’s health. 33  Justice Breyer 
“conclude[d] that neither [of the law’s] provisions offers medical 
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each 
imposes.”34 
Similar to the TRAP laws at issue in Whole Woman’s 
Health, there is likely little evidence to support the usefulness of 
ultrasound description mandates to improve women’s health. It is 
not clear that states would be able to provide evidence to 
demonstrate that these laws serve their purported goal of improving 
women’s understanding of abortion prior to undergoing the 
procedure. What may be less clear than with TRAP laws, however, 
is whether ultrasound description mandates impede access to 
abortion, thereby still constituting an undue burden in light of no 
beneficial evidence. 35  Hence, while Whole Woman’s Health 
provides a helpful basis for understanding how the Court may look 
to laws that espouse a woman-protective rationale in the future, it 
does not provide a clear answer for whether ultrasound description 
                                                
31 Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-
98). 
32 Id. at 2296. 
33 Id. at 2311 (“We have found nothing in Texas’ record evidence that shows 
that, compared to prior law (which required a ‘working arrangement’ with a 
doctor with admitting privileges), the new law advanced Texas’ legitimate 
interest in protecting women’s health. We add that, when directly asked at 
oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance in which the new 
requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment, 
Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such a case.”). 
34 Id. at 2300. 
35 Ultrasound description mandates may, in fact, impede access to abortion 
care, in part by, in effect, requiring an additional waiting period prior to the 
abortion procedure (a wait that may be a substantial obstacle for many 
women, particularly those who may need to travel long distances for care). 
The ultrasound may also provide a financial barrier to women seeking 
abortion care. Ultimately, there is not yet enough evidence to know whether 
these barriers rise to the level of the undue burden standard expanded upon 
by Whole Woman’s Health.   
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mandates would likely be struck down by the Court as an “undue 
burden” on women’s access to abortion. Moreover, the Court in 
Whole Woman’s Health provides no guidance for how the First 
Amendment questions implicated by ultrasound description 
mandates should be interpreted.  
Prior to the holding in Whole Woman’s Health, however, 
several courts used the previous guidance from Casey to analyze the 
constitutionality of ultrasound description mandates.36 In particular, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enjoined the 
enforcement of North Carolina’s ultrasound description mandate, 
claiming that the compelled physician speech is “ideological in 
intent and in kind” and represents a violation of the First 
Amendment. 37  In Texas, however, the Fifth Circuit held that a 
similar law did not violate the “undue burden” standard established 
by Casey, allowing the Texas legislature to continue to require that 
women seeking abortions first be required to hear an oral 
description during their mandated pre-abortion ultrasound.38 Again, 
the court focused on the patient’s rights as only tangential to the 
clinician’s, emphasizing that the Texas law does not violate a 
physician’s First Amendment right not to speak, but providing little 
analysis as to whether the law may violate an undefined right of the 
patient not to hear.39  
 
III.  ESTABLISHING A PATIENT’S RIGHT NOT TO HEAR  
 
Legal advocates have struggled with how to counter the 
wave of state legislation that regulates – and arguably restricts – 
abortion access by requiring pre-abortion ultrasounds. 40  While 
                                                
36 See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28, 29 
(Okla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013). See also, Stuart v. 
Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2014).  
37 Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 242.  
38 Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
576 (5th Cir. 2012). 
39 Id. at 583. 
40 See generally, e.g., Silbey, supra note 9, at 45; and Suter, supra note 5, at 
27. 
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Whole Woman’s Health may open the door to new challenges of 
“speech and display” laws, 41  prior to this case, advocates and 
scholars had been generally pessimistic about whether ultrasound 
requirements may be successfully struck down as an “undue 
burden” on a woman’s ability to access abortion services.42 In part, 
this pessimism arose because the Casey Court upheld a 
Pennsylvania abortion-specific informed consent requirement that 
compels physician speech and, in doing so, provided little guidance 
to lower courts about how they should analyze these types of laws.43 
This pessimism persists because lower courts have consistently 
“[reproduced] the idea [from Casey] that abortion has negative 
mental health consequences while finding mandatory speech 
requirements do not burden a woman’s access to abortion.”44 In 
fact, Casey arguably was critical in opening the floodgates for a 
broader variety of restrictions on access to abortion services, leading 
scholars and advocates to re-envision how ultrasound description 
mandates can be struck down through means other than the “undue 
burden” standard,45 and leading some to focus on whether the ever-
evolving First Amendment doctrine may more effectively strike 
down these restrictions as violations of a health professional’s right 
not to speak.46  
With this notion of a professional’s right against compelled 
speech, though, also comes the corollary notion of the right against 
compelled listening.47 As Caroline Mala Corbin notes in one of the 
                                                
41 See supra Part II.  
42 See, e.g., Gaylord & Maloney, supra note 5, at 645–46; see also Aziza 
Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 
Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51, 55 
(2015) (citing Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, 
and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
291, 291 (2009)). 
43 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (“If 
the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is 
truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”); see also 
Suter, supra note 5, at 22. 
44 Ahmed, supra note 41, at 55 (citing Borgmann, supra note 41, at 291).  
45 See, e.g., id. 
46 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 7, at 941. 
47 Id. at 940. 
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few scholarly texts to explore the patient’s right not to hear: “While 
the right to speak, the right to listen, and the right against being 
compelled to speak are well-established First Amendment rights, 
free speech jurisprudence has not yet recognized a ‘right against 
compelled listening.’”48 Even though there has been much more 
attention paid to the First Amendment rights of doctors than to the 
First Amendment rights of patients, Corbin asserts that the notion 
of a right against compelled listening is also strongly supported by 
the values underlying the First Amendment, including the 
promotion of autonomy, self-determination, self-realization, and the 
marketplace of ideas.49 As Corbin writes, “without both a listener 
and a speaker, freedom of expression is as empty as the sound of 
one hand clapping.”50 Corbin’s analysis focuses on some of the 
theoretical principles, further described below, including the 
applicability of the “captive audience” doctrine. What Corbin fails 
to do, however, is establish how the right against compelled 
listening would not only potentially provide a stronger foundation 
for striking down ultrasound description mandates, but how it would 
do so in a manner that bolsters informed consent law and the 
necessary value of the doctor-patient relationship within public 
health law more generally.51 
How, then, might one establish this right against compelled 
listening for women during pre-abortion ultrasounds? 
Unfortunately, there is little doctrine from which to draw this right. 
In fact, one recent case, McCullen v. Coakley, indicates that the 
Supreme Court may, in fact, have explicitly rejected the notion of a 
First Amendment right not to hear in 2014.52 In McCullen, the Court 
                                                
48 Id.  
49  See, e.g., id. at 942; and see, Ellen Camburn, Doctor-Patient-State 
Relationship: The Problem with Informed Consent and State Mandated 
Ultrasounds Prior to Abortions, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 311 
(2013). 
50 Corbin, supra note 7, at 965 (citing Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom of Speech 
for Libraries and Librarians, 85 LAW. LIBR. J. 71, 77 (1993)). 
51 See infra Part IV. 
52 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2545–46 (2014) (“Protecting people 
from speech they do not want to hear is not a function that the First 
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struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a Massachusetts statute 
that prohibited individuals from “knowingly [standing] on a ‘public 
way or sidewalk’ within 35 feet of . . . any place, other than a 
hospital, where abortions are performed.” 53  However, the 
circumstances facing the patient in the context of pre-abortion 
ultrasound description mandates can be substantially distinguished 
from the circumstances in McCullen in two primary ways. It is 
within these distinct circumstances that the right against compelled 
listening can begin to be situated.  
First, in the pre-abortion ultrasound context, the listener 
(i.e., the patient) is subjected to government-compelled professional 
speech within the context of a clinician-patient relationship, not the 
speech within a public forum at issue in McCullen. Second, the 
listener is exposed to the “uncomfortable message” that she may not 
want to hear not on “the public streets and sidewalks,” where one 
may not reasonably expect privacy (as in McCullen),54 but in the 
intimate and confined setting of a doctor’s office. She is often held 
figuratively “captive” by the stirrups holding her feet or by the 
ultrasound wand across her torso and unable to avoid the speech in 
question without leaving the appointment and, should she still seek 
an abortion, without leaving the state where the law is enacted. The 
next sub-sections examine the limited, though evolving, doctrine 
around each of these distinctions, including a discussion of 
professional speech and the beginnings of case law that lay a 
rhetorical foundation for the recognition of a listener’s rights. As 
described below, the captive nature of the interaction implicated by 
ultrasound description mandates is sufficiently distinct from the 
public spaces about which Chief Justice Roberts wrote in McCullen. 
This distinction may thereby implicate the “captive audience” 
doctrine to establish that patients in medical settings, where there is 
little or no opportunity to simply avoid the speech, may have a First 
Amendment right not to listen.  
 
                                                
Amendment allows the government to undertake in the public streets and 
sidewalks.”). 
53 Id. at 2525 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 120E1/2(a), (b) (West 
2012)).  
54 Id. at 2529. 
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A. Bridging the First Amendment Rights of Professionals 
and Patients  
 
As mentioned, one primary way to distinguish McCullen is 
to note the identity of the speaker. The Court’s holding in McCullen, 
when read narrowly, refutes a right against compelled listening 
when the First Amendment rights of private speakers outweigh the 
potential rights of the listener.55 In the case of abortion informed 
consent, however, courts must now grapple with the simultaneous 
rights of the patient-as-listener and the rights of the physician-as-
speaker, compelled by the state to speak.56 Unlike in McCullen, 
these rights are not inherently at odds, but are instead often aligned 
in the interest of forming and promoting a physician-patient 
relationship in the context of medical care. The professional’s 
rights, then, should not only be viewed as in conflict with, but rather 
strengthened by, the listener’s right to determine what to hear.57  
                                                
55 Id. at 2541. 
56 See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015) (“Compelled speech is particularly suspect because it 
can directly affect listeners as well as speakers. Listeners may have difficulty 
discerning that the message is the state's, not the speaker's, especially where 
the ‘speaker [is] intimately connected with the communication advanced.’”) 
(quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 576 (1995)); see also, e.g., Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion 
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (“. . . whereas Casey 
only required the physician to make certain materials about childbirth and the 
fetus ‘available’ to the woman, the physician here is required to explain the 
results of sonogram and fetal heart auscultation, and the woman is required to 
listen to the sonogram results.”). 
57 This is in contrast to what Paula Berg describes as Casey’s understanding 
of a patient’s right against compelled listening. Berg noted that “the Court 
characterized and decided [Casey] as if it involved a bipartite conflict between 
physicians' right to speak and states' right to regulate professionals, rather than 
a tripartite conflict among physicians' speech rights, government's power to 
regulate professionals, and patients' audience-based right to receive 
information.” Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor--
Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 
B.U. L. REV. 201, 220 (1994).  
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This starting point – the rights of the physician-as-speaker – 
admittedly provides an unstable foundation. As numerous scholars 
and courts have noted, the doctrine around professional speech is 
“murky” at best.58 Therefore, determining which standard of review 
should be applied to professional speech and how such standard 
should be applied is far from a settled area of law.59  
Generally, it is accepted – largely through the common law 
doctrine of informed consent – that “the state may freely regulate 
physician speech as part of its regulation of the practice of 
medicine.”60 Yet, “[t]he Supreme Court has said relatively little 
about the First Amendment’s coverage of professional advice and 
communications.”61 Ultimately, the lower courts have only “cryptic 
guidance” on how to “make sense” of professional speech 
regulations.62 There is still uncertainty regarding whether the state 
exceeds its power to protect public health when it “[requires] 
physicians to engage in ideological speech,” and whether and when 
the state may “[require] physicians to communicate information that 
the medical profession regards as false, or prohibits physicians from 
communicating information that the medical professional regards as 
true.” 63  This question, while complex, is ultimately beyond the 
scope of this article. 
Regardless of the instability of the professional speech 
doctrine, the professional identity of the speaker in the context of 
state-mandated ultrasound description provides a starting point for 
establishing a listener’s First Amendment rights against compelled 
                                                
58 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1186 (11th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016). 
59 See, e.g., Post, supra note 5, at 944; Suter, supra note 5, at 23; Zick, supra 
note 15, at 1296 (“Lower courts have been left to divine a doctrine from 
concurrences, brief snippets in plurality opinions, and precedents in which 
professional speech was regulated but no doctrinal framework 
materialized.”). See also, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 
YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016) (“What is strikingly – and perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly – still absent from the case law and the legal literature is a 
comprehensive theory of professional speech.”).  
60 Post, supra note 5, at 939.   
61 Zick, supra note 15, at 1291.  
62 Id.  
63 Post, supra note 5, at 939.   
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listening in a context quite distinct from the context at issue in 
McCullen.64  
It is the unique character of the professional-listener 
relationship, and in particular, the doctor-patient relationship, that 
has created the need for not only an informed consent doctrine, but 
also for a recognition and a valuing of a patient’s right not to hear. 
As Claudia Haupt describes in her recent article on professional 
speech, professional speech is of a distinct character. 65  Haupt 
explains how “‘learned’ professionals,” including doctors, form 
“knowledge communities,” “communities whose principle raison 
d’être is the generation and dissemination of knowledge.”66 These 
knowledge communities fundamentally re-shape how one thinks 
about regulating professional spaces and professional relationships. 
“Sometimes,” Haupt writes, “regulation aligns with” the collective 
“professional insights” of a knowledge community, but at other 
times, it “contradicts them.”67 Still, the uniqueness of the learned 
professions as knowledge communities “informs” both how one 
justifies the “First Amendment protection” of professional speech, 
as well as “the limits of that protection, the permissibility of 
regulating the professions” through licensure and other 
mechanisms, “and the imposition and extent of tort liability for 
professional malpractice.”68  In particular, the existence of these 
knowledge communities (built around professional consensus and 
specialized knowledge) fundamentally reshapes how one regulates 
the transmission of knowledge from professional to layperson, from 
doctor to patient, from speaker to listener. As Haupt explains, 
“Professionals speak not only for themselves but also as members 
                                                
64 Haupt, supra note 59, at 1259 (“[T]he doctrinal basis of professional speech 
appears indeterminate at best. But a wide-angle view reveals that, despite the 
initial lack of clarity in Casey, the Court seems to have at least a hunch that 
speech communicated by professionals in a professional-client relationship 
for the purpose of providing professional advice is somehow distinctive.”). 
65 Id. at 1241. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 1245. 
68 Id. at 1238.  
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of a learned profession: they ‘assist[] individuals in making personal 
choices based on the cumulative knowledge of the profession.’”69 
Building on the professional’s distinctive role, as described 
by Haupt, the listener – the patient – also has distinct autonomy 
interests; these interests are exacerbated by the inherent power 
imbalance within the doctor-patient relationship. Unlike the patient 
who may walk through the crowd of protestors in McCullen, the 
patient in a doctor’s office may depend upon dialogue with a 
professional in order to make an informed decision. 70  These 
“decisional autonomy interests,” as Haupt describes them, 71  are 
unique. Professional speech – unlike lay speech – by its very nature 
“implicates the autonomy interests of both the speaker and the 
listener.”72 Building on the notion of knowledge communities, the 
professional-listener relationship or the physician-patient 
relationship is “characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge.”73 
The patient is seeking professional speech “precisely because of this 
asymmetry.”74   
Informed consent has long been chosen as the legal 
mechanism to “fix” this asymmetry. 75  But in the context of 
ultrasound description mandates, this asymmetry also demands 
something broader: the recognition of a listener’s agency and, 
ultimately, a listener’s rights to receive or deny information. In the 
context of any doctor-patient relationship, the patient is vulnerable 
and often disempowered.76 Dependent on the doctor’s professional 
                                                
69 Id. at 1242 (citing Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional 
Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
771, 773 (1999)).  
70 Haupt, supra note 59, at 1243. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. (emphasis added).  
74 Id. 
75 See Zick, supra note 15, at 1352 (“States are rightly concerned about the 
asymmetries of power and information that inhere in professional client 
relationships. Malpractice and informed consent laws seek to account for such 
concerns.”). 
76  See Berg, supra note 57, at 227 (“Patients' lack of power within the 
structure of the doctor-patient relationship leads to passivity and a reluctance 
to question or challenge physicians. [citation omitted] A large body of 
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guidance and the knowledge community’s insights, the patient 
relies on a physician’s speech to determine her choices and to come 
to an informed decision. 77  In the context of a doctor-patient 
relationship in which the state can dictate specific physician speech, 
the patient’s vulnerabilities are deepened. Her interests “are only 
served if the professional communicates information that is accurate 
(under the knowledge community’s current assessment), reliable, 
and personally tailored to the specific situation of the listener.”78  
State-mandated professional speech, such as ultrasound 
abortion mandates, runs afoul of these interests, replacing the 
knowledge community’s assessment of a listener’s needs and the 
critical discourse between a physician and patient79 with a specific 
and standardized state message, amplified through the mouthpiece 
of the physician and without recognition of listener agency. In so 
doing, it exacerbates the imbalance of the doctor-patient 
relationship and ignores the distinct speech rights of the listener. It 
replaces not only the professional’s autonomy and independent 
judgment with the state’s judgment, but with it, it replaces the 
patient’s decisional autonomy. 80  Regardless of the professional 
                                                
research has demonstrated that patients rarely ask questions during 
conversations with physicians or take control of topics that are discussed.”).  
77 See id. at 224 (“Patient/clients form professional relationships because they 
lack the information needed to make a rational decision on their own about a 
problem that is within the professional's area of expertise. The goal of this 
relationship is to identify the patient/client's particular needs and interests and 
to obtain expert advice about the most appropriate course of action.”). 
78 Haupt, supra note 59, at 1271.  
79 See Berg, supra note 57, at 235–36 (“When a patient . . .  must decide on a 
course of treatment, the ‘marketplace of ideas’ that informs his or her decision 
making is provided mainly by physicians. In conversations with physicians, 
patients seek to discover the nature of the medical problem . . . Patients' 
discovery of their medical truth – that is, of the particular course of treatment 
that is best for them – depends on an unconstrained flow of information from 
physicians.”).  
80 Haupt, supra note 59, at 1271–72 (“As Justice Stevens pointed out in his 
opinion in Casey, ‘[d]ecisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to 
inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is 
best.’ ” (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992)). 
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speech rights at issue, without a recognition of a patient’s right to 
demand information or to refuse information, both the 
professional’s and the patient’s agency are put into question.  
The listener’s interests are then implicated by the unique 
nature of professional speech and by the unique dynamics of the 
professional-patient relationship. “Compelling physician speech, 
like silencing it, implicates both doctors’ right to speak and patients’ 
right to receive information.”81 Patients have an “audience-based 
interest in receiving information from their physicians;” 82  by 
regulating physician speech, regardless of the validity of the 
regulation, the state inevitably impacts the rights of the listener, and 
these restrictions should be analyzed as such.  
In recent years, in addition to the scholarly analysis, various 
courts have struggled with how to balance the rights of the state, of 
professionals, and of patients in the context of “[s]tate regulations 
of professional speech [that] have become more prevalent, more 
politically tinged, and more likely to structure and dictate the 
specific content of professional-client interactions.” 83  From 
multiple cases that uphold restrictions on “sexual orientation change 
efforts” (SOCE) counseling84 to a case that upholds restrictions on 
physicians’ ability to discuss firearm access and safety,85  lower 
courts have recently been faced with determining how and whether 
to recognize a patient’s right to listen or to avoid listening, and what 
these patients’ rights may mean for regulations of professional 
                                                
81 Berg, supra note 57, at 220.  
82 Id. 
83 Zick, supra note 15, at 1292. 
84  Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
California’s law restricting the provision of SOCE therapy to minors as a 
constitutional “regulation of professional conduct”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. 
Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (upholding New Jersey’s 
law restricting the provision of SOCE therapy to minors as a constitutional 
regulation of professional speech). 
85 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016).  
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speech.86 In the abortion context, too, from Rust v. Sullivan87 to 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 88  the Supreme Court has more 
                                                
86  See Zick, supra note 15, at 1294 (arguing that “[r]ecently enacted 
professional speech regulations do not merely interfere with the transmission 
and receipt of expert knowledge, transgress patients' and professionals' rights 
to receive or impart information about medical care, or implicate the activities 
of ‘knowledge communities’ . . . They are troublesome for a related but 
distinctive reason. These regulations suppress, alter, or dictate professional 
rights speech—professional client communications about, concerning, or 
relating to the recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional rights.”). 
87  In Rust, the Court ultimately found that regulations that prohibited 
recipients of Title X funding from “counseling, referral, and the provision of 
information regarding abortion as a method of family planning” did not 
violate physician’s First Amendment rights. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
193 (1991). However, the Rust Court also recognized that the regulations in 
question “d[id] not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient 
relationship,” in part, because the regulations did not affect all doctors or all 
patients in a given jurisdiction. Id. at 200. In doing so, the Court quickly 
acknowledges that a woman may at times have a “right to receive” 
information about abortion. (“Under the [Title X] regulations . . . a doctor's 
ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive, information concerning 
abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X 
project remains unfettered.”) Id. at 203. Despite this brief nod to a patient’s 
potential rights, the Rust court largely ignores the patient’s “audience-based 
interests.” See Berg, supra note 57, at 219–20 (“The unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, upon which the Rust Court based its analysis, balances 
the government's need to make funding decisions against the constitutional 
rights of government agents and employees while performing official duties. 
The doctrine does not address the impact that funding restrictions may have 
on the First Amendment rights of listeners who depend upon publicly 
financed speakers for information. The Rust Court's reliance on the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions, rather than on the First Amendment rights of 
patients, leads it to overlook the danger that restrictions on the speech of 
publicly funded physicians pose to patients' audience-based interests.”).  
88 The majority in Casey does not discuss a patient’s right not to listen, though 
Justice Stevens, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
describes how “[w]henever government commands private citizens to speak 
or to listen, careful review of the justification for that command is particularly 
appropriate.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 921–22 
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens 
goes on to describe how, for many women, the information required by 
Pennsylvania’s statute would be “clearly useless” and “thus constitute and 
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indirectly wrestled with whether patients may have a right to receive 
or reject information within doctor-patient relationships, though the 
Court has only barely touched upon this question in each of these 
cases. 89  Ultimately, while case law has not yet established that 
listeners have a right to hear or not to hear, a set of recent cases have 
begun to develop some rhetorical underpinnings for this type of 
analysis, a rhetoric that, if applied to the ultrasound description 
mandate context, may ultimately provide the critical discursive 
nexus through which these regulations may be successfully struck 
down.  
For example, in a recent triad of vacated opinions named 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit 
specifically grappled with whether patients should have a corollary 
right to avoid professional speech.90 At issue in Wollschlaeger is a 
Florida law, the Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act, which, in part, 
restricts how and when health care providers can inquire about a 
patient’s gun ownership or discuss firearm safety.91 The court has 
                                                
unnecessary – and therefore undue – burden on the women’s constitutional 
liberty . . .” Id. As Paula Berg writes about Casey, the majority “characterized 
and decided the case as if it involved a bipartite conflict between physicians' 
right to speak and states' right to regulate professionals, rather than a tripartite 
conflict among physicians' speech rights, government's power to regulate 
professionals, and patients' audience- based right to receive information.” 
Berg, supra note 57, at 220.  
89 Berg, supra note 57, at 219 (“[T]he Court [in Rust and in Casey] approaches 
its analysis of government restrictions on the content of doctor-patient 
discourse exclusively from the standpoint of their interference with 
physicians' right to speak. The Court ignores that the regulation of physician 
speech also impacts on patients' receipt of medical information.”). 
90 In fact, the court grapples with this question again and again, as the case 
has been vacated and superseded on rehearing three times since the matter 
first came to the Eleventh Circuit in July of 2014.  Wollschlaeger v. Governor 
of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 797 
F. 3d 859 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016). 
91 Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1167–68 (“The Act seeks to protect patient 
privacy by restricting irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physicians on 
the sensitive issue of firearm ownership and by prohibiting harassment and 
discrimination on the basis of firearm ownership. The Act does not prevent 
physicians from speaking with patients about firearms generally. Nor does it 
prohibit specific inquiry or recordkeeping about a patient’s firearm-
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now issued three different opinions in the case, all of which rely on 
a different level of First Amendment scrutiny to analyze the 
professional speech restriction,92 and all of which have been vacated 
and superseded by the subsequent opinion. In each opinion, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit upholds Florida’s restriction on 
professional speech, concluding that a patient has a right to not have 
to hear a doctor’s warnings or inquiries about gun ownership.93  
Throughout its analysis, the Wollschlaeger court grounded 
aspects of its decision in a depiction of the listener’s (the patient’s) 
“powerlessness” and vulnerability.94 At the start of the more recent 
opinion (decided in 2016 and since vacated), the Eleventh Circuit 
quoted First Amendment scholar, Paula Berg, describing the unique 
nature of the physician-patient relationship:   
 
Society has traditionally accorded physicians a high 
degree of deference due to their superior knowledge, 
educational pedigree, position of prestige, and 
“charismatic authority,” resulting from their 
“symbolic role as conquerors of disease and death.” . 
. . This deference reaches its apex in the examination 
room where patients are in a position of relative 
powerlessness. Patients must place their trust in the 
physicians' guidance and submit to the physicians' 
authority.95  
 
                                                
ownership status when the physician determines in good faith, based on the 
circumstances of that patient’s case, that such information is relevant to the 
patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others.”).  
92 The most recent opinion, since vacated, “pass[es] no judgment on what 
level of scrutiny should apply here,” and instead concludes that “the Act 
survives even strict scrutiny as the State has asserted a compelling interest 
and the Act is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Id. at 1186. 
93 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 
F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014). 
94 Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1168.  
95 Id. (quoting Berg, supra note 57, at 226). 
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Throughout its opinion, the court builds upon this rhetoric of an 
inherent power imbalance between physician and patient. The Act, 
the court noted, was an extension of the long tradition of regulating 
the doctor-patient relationship, with the ultimate goal of protecting 
patients in the context of this asymmetry. 96  In the multiple 
Wollschlaeger decisions, the court additionally centered its analyses 
of a physician’s First Amendment rights around the patient’s 
corollary rights, specifically focusing on the captive nature of the 
patient, and how this contributes to the dynamic of physician-patient 
speech.97 “In such a situation,” the court wrote, “the balance of 
power between doctor and patient will often make a patient feel as 
if he has no choice but to listen and answer a doctor's questions, 
especially when seeing another doctor may not be practicable, or 
even possible.”98 By building its analysis from this notion of the 
vulnerable patient, the Wollschlaeger court, despite its flaws, 99 
began to provide a basis for conceptualizing how a patient’s rights 
to listen/not to listen may be at the very foundation of analyzing 
regulations of professional speech.    
 Another set of cases analyzing the constitutionality of bans 
on sexual-orientation change efforts counseling (“SOCE”) has also 
begun to grapple with the question of whether First Amendment 
doctrine provides for a corollary right for patients to listen or to 
refuse to listen. For example, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of New 
                                                
96  Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 868 (“To protect patients, society has long 
imposed upon physicians’ certain duties and restrictions that define the 
boundaries of good medical care. In keeping with this tradition, the State 
passed the Act.”). 
97  See, e.g., Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1198 (“This [doctor-patient] 
relationship is not conducted in an open forum; it takes place behind the 
closed doors of the examination room. As such, a doctor will usually have a 
captive audience of one: the patient . . . . In these moments of vulnerability, 
patients could hardly be expected to affirmatively rebuff their doctors by 
demanding all non-medically relevant questioning cease.”). 
98 Id. at 1200.  
99 The court in Wollschlaeger fails to recognize, for example, that physicians 
are not necessarily able to determine the required relevance of a discussion 
about firearms with a patient if the inquiry itself is restricted by law. Yet, if 
physicians do not inquire, patients are simply never given the important 
opportunity to reject or to request the professional speech. 
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Jersey,100 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a New Jersey 
statute that restricted state-licensed counselors from providing 
minors with SOCE therapy.101 In Doe, unlike in Wollschlaeger,102 
the plaintiffs are not the potential professional speakers, but instead 
the potential listeners, the patients.103 The Doe plaintiffs, a minor 
and his parents, challenged New Jersey’s legislation, in part, by 
asserting that the law burdened their First Amendment right to 
receive information.104  
While the Third Circuit ultimately concluded that the 
legislation neither violated the “[professional’s] right to speak” nor 
the patient’s “right to receive information,”105 it began to slightly 
open the door for rhetoric surrounding how the First Amendment 
may protect both the speaker and the listener.106 In part, the court, 
throughout its discussion, recognized that there may be, in certain 
contexts, a right for patients to listen.107 While the court ultimately 
determined that the reciprocal right to listen, to receive information, 
is not violated in the instant case, the court arguably did so 
clumsily.108 Instead of providing an analysis for why the patient 
does not independently have a right to listen, the court simply found 
                                                
100 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of New Jersey, 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
101 Id.  
102 Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1167. 
103 Doe, 783 F.3d at 154.  
104 Id. at 155.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. (“Appellants are correct that the First Amendment protects both the 
speaker and the recipient of information.” (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976))).  
107 Doe, 783 F.3d at 154. 
108  After establishing that the Doe court believes that a patient’s right to 
listen/not to listen does exist, the only analysis provided in Doe about why it 
fails to recognize a right to listen in the legislation at-issue here is provided 
by the following: “We are not suggesting that Appellants do not have the right 
to receive the information for the reason that the legislature enacted A3371, 
which bars the provision of SOCE counseling to minors; rather, Appellants' 
right to receive the information is not violated because we already 
upheld A3371, which bans the provision of SOCE counseling to minors, 
against a constitutional challenge in King.” Id. at 155–56. 
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that, by upholding the ban on clinician speech, the simultaneous ban 
on the listener’s ability to receive SOCE information is also upheld. 
Because the professional’s First Amendment rights are not violated 
by the statute, the court argued, neither are the patient’s.109   
As applied to ultrasound description mandates, this myopic 
understanding of listener’s rights as being contingent upon 
speaker’s rights is problematic. As previously described, 
professional speech doctrine makes it unclear whether laws that 
compel physician “speech and display” mandates will successfully 
be struck down on First Amendment grounds. But what Doe and 
Wollschlaeger do provide is the potential beginnings for rhetorical 
analysis of what courts are now beginning to accept: that in the 
unique and, in many ways, strange contexts of professional-patient 
relationships, there may be a right for patients to listen or to refuse 
to listen.  
 While the courts in Doe and Wollschlaeger come out 
differently in their analyses of whether a patient may have a right to 
hear or deny information that the state has determined is harmful, 
both cases begin to provide a framework for re-imagining the First 
Amendment rights of both doctor and patient, opening the door for 
a patients’ right against compelled listening in the case of pre-
abortion ultrasound descriptions. While these opinions provide little 
doctrinal certainty, they can be observed as potential forays into 
how courts may be able to move towards incorporating an analysis 
of the rights of a patient into analyses of the First Amendment rights 
of professionals. As will later be discussed, however, these cases 
provide for a potentially problematic precedent for public health law 
more broadly, and Wollschlaeger’s broader holding and analysis, in 
particular, is flawed, at best. Still, in grounding some of their 
discussion in listeners’ rights, these cases may allow for another 
rhetorical avenue for advancing women’s rights against compelled 
listening in the context of abortion informed consent.  
 
B. The “Captive” Patient 
 
An additional way to distinguish the McCullen Court’s 
rejection of the “right not to hear” is to recognize that the context in 
                                                
109 Doe, 783 F.3d at 155-56. 
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which ultrasound descriptions are required may uniquely implicate 
the “captive audience” doctrine. As the previous section 
demonstrates, there is little doctrine explicitly promoting a general 
First Amendment right against compelled listening, and the existing 
analysis is fairly preliminary. For this reason, ultrasound description 
mandates may, in fact, be better analyzed by applying the captive 
audience doctrine to doctor-patient interactions.  
The captive audience doctrine is one of the few ways that 
the law recognizes some First Amendment protection for both 
speakers and listeners. 110  As the court in Wollschlaeger states, 
“[a]lthough the First Amendment usually requires that the burden 
of avoiding unwanted speech be placed on the listener, the captive-
audience doctrine applies in certain instances where the listener 
cannot avoid being exposed to that speech.”111 Even when speakers 
have a right to communicate, a listener’s legal rights may be 
balanced against a speaker’s rights; 112  in this way, the captive 
audience doctrine may provide an answer for how to address 
ultrasound description mandates even if the compelled speech does 
not violate the First Amendment rights of the professional. If a 
listener is “unwilling,” the captive-audience doctrine finds that 
speakers may not “foist” their speech onto the listener.113 “Instead, 
the government may restrict such speech if ‘substantial privacy 
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.’”114 
The setting in which the speech occurs is a central 
component in analyzing this doctrine. 115  Unlike the listener in 
McCullen v. Coakley, the listener on an ultrasound table in a 
physician’s office is in a physically vulnerable and captive state, 
unable to easily escape the government’s message – as 
communicated through the physician – should she refuse to listen. 
                                                
110  See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 7, at 941; Marcy Strauss, Redefining the 
Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTING CONST. L. QUARTERLY 85, 108–09 
(1992). 
111 Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1199 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 
459 (2011); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975)).  
112 Corbin, supra note 7, at 941.  
113 Id. at 943.  
114 Id.  
115 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
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As Chief Justice Roberts states in McCullen, “[on public streets and 
sidewalks], a listener often encounters speech he might otherwise 
tune out” and the captive audience doctrine need not be applied.116 
In contrast, in labor settings or in the privacy of one’s home,117 the 
captive audience doctrine may apply if the listener “cannot readily 
avoid the message.”118 
While the Supreme Court has not readily applied the captive 
audience doctrine to medical settings,119 scholars and the courts 
have preliminarily suggested such an application. 120  Certainly, 
given the expectation of privacy within medical facilities along with 
the right to make one’s own health-care decisions, the captive 
audience doctrine should be applied to these settings in order to 
protect the patient from unwanted speech. Listeners in a medical 
environment should not reasonably be “expected to leave in order 
to avoid unwanted speech”121 nor should listeners be “held ‘captive’ 
by medical circumstance[].”122 
In addition to recognizing the nature of the setting, in 
applying the captive audience doctrine, courts analyze the extent to 
which the listener can simply avoid  their “captivity.”123 First, courts 
look to whether the listener can readily avoid the unwanted 
speech.124 In other words, the listener must show “that a substantial 
                                                
116 Id.  
117 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 110, at 95; Paul M. Secunda, Toward the 
Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience 
Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 209, 214 (2008). 
118 Corbin, supra note 7, at 942. 
119 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1995) (citing 
Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 673 (Fla. 
1993)) (discussing how a patient may be “held ‘captive’ by medical 
circumstances.”). The Court in Madsen does not, however, explicitly hold that 
the captive audience doctrine can or should be applied to medical settings. 
120 See, e.g., id. at 781; Corbin, supra note 7, at 947; Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d 
at 1199 (“The captive-audience doctrine has special force in confrontational 
settings and in cases regarding access to medical facilities.”).  But see 
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
121 Corbin, supra note 7, at 946.  
122 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 678 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So.2d at 673). 
123 See Corbin, supra note 7, at 944. 
124 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988). 
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privacy interest is ‘being invaded in an essentially intolerable’ 
way.”125 Second, courts note that the listener must “not have to quit 
the space to avoid the message.”126 As the Eleventh Circuit stated 
in one of the vacated opinions in Wollschlaeger, “while offensive 
speech cannot be curtailed just because a listener does not wish to 
hear it, that general rule does not extend so far as to include speech 
‘so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it’”127  
Applying these principles to ultrasound description 
mandates, it would be difficult for the state to demonstrate that the 
audience in question (i.e., the patient) would be able to “readily 
avoid” the physician’s speech.128 For one, more so than in other 
settings where the captive audience doctrine has been recognized, 
the audience in question is physically required to hear the 
government message129 because the ultrasound mandates require 
“simultaneous” descriptions. This means that while the patient is 
likely in a hospital gown, stirrups, or with her abdomen exposed and 
touched by the “speaker,” she is simultaneously listening to the 
doctor orally describe the ultrasound image as it appears.130  
Beyond physical captivity, a woman is additionally captive 
to the legal requirements that she must face prior to obtaining a 
procedure she has determined she needs. A woman comes to her 
                                                
125 Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1199 (citing Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459). 
126Corbin, supra note 7, at 944 (citing J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile 
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2312 (1999)); see also 
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1199 (citing Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459). 
127 Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1200 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 
716 (2000)) (emphasis added). 
128 See Berg, supra note 57, at 256 (describing how patients may be captive 
to government-mandated messages within the context of the physician-patient 
relationship. “Once in the presence of a physician, substantial physical and 
psychological barriers make government- mandated messages extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to ignore. While patients can simply discard 
printed materials, they have ‘no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit 
and to try not to listen’ when the state's message is communicated orally.”).  
129 See Corbin, supra note 7, at 943. 
130 See Silbey, supra note 9, at 25–26 (describing how “[s]ubmitting to a 
vaginal ultrasound and being forced to listen to and see the results of an 
ultrasound while physically restrained in stirrups and undressed from the 
waist down is degrading.”).  
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doctor seeking an abortion and she is first required to listen to an 
ultrasound description and to certify on an informed consent form 
that she has done so, all prior to obtaining the care that she seeks. In 
order to achieve her goal of obtaining an abortion, she is certainly, 
by law, unable to avoid the speech in question. If she is forced to 
“quit the space to avoid the message,” 131  she also forgoes any 
opportunity to obtain abortion care in her state. The physical and 
legal circumstances in which she finds herself create captivity. 
One major limitation of applying the captive-audience 
doctrine to the ultrasound mandate context is that this doctrine 
traditionally applies to private speakers.132 In the abortion context, 
while the physician may at times be the “mouthpiece” of the state,133 
the speaker’s identity is more analogous to a private speaker than a 
government speaker, particularly when viewed from the listener’s 
perspective. That said, even if the professional speaker in this 
context is seen as a government-speaker, when the “government’s 
message crosses over from available to required viewing,” the 
captive audience doctrine may still apply.134 
 
C. The Intrusive Nature of Troubling Information  
 
Building on the captive audience doctrine, it is also 
necessary to recognize that not  only are the circumstances of 
speech consequential to whether a regulation of speech survives 
constitutional analysis, but, as the Supreme Court made clear in 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,135 the particularly troubling nature 
of the message being conveyed may also factor into a First 
Amendment analysis of a listener’s rights.136 In Went For It, the 
Court analyzed a set of Florida Bar rules, which prohibited lawyers 
from soliciting “personal injury or wrongful death” clients through 
                                                
131 Corbin, supra note 7, at 944 (citing Balkin, supra note 125, at 2312). 
132 Id. at 942. 
133 Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F.Supp.2d 585, 609 (M.D.N.C. 2014).  
134 Camburn, supra note 49, at 311. 
135 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
136  Id. at 638–39 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)). 
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direct mail within 30 days of an “accident or disaster.”137 The Court 
held that the restriction on speech was constitutionally valid.138  
While Went for It is distinct in many ways from the 
ultrasound description mandates at issue here, Went For It’s 
analysis may, in part, be applicable because of the Court’s emphasis 
on the role of the effect of the speech on the listener in its analysis 
of whether or not to uphold this speech restriction. In part, the Court 
looked to one of the substantial government interests asserted by the 
petitioners – a concern for “protecting the privacy and tranquility of 
personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, 
unsolicited contact by lawyers . . .” (emphasis added). 139  In 
particular, the Court cited the petitioners’ brief and petition for 
certiorari, which stated, “[b]ecause direct-mail solicitations in the 
wake of accidents are perceived by the public as intrusive . . . the 
reputation of the legal profession in the eyes of Floridians has 
suffered commensurately.”140 
Applying this analysis, it becomes even clearer that a right 
against compelled listening may exist in the pre-abortion ultrasound 
description context. In Went For It, the law at issue restricts visual 
messages conveyed through direct mail, with the notion that 
receiving mail at one’s home while the recipient is in a vulnerable 
emotional state is “intrusive.”141 The Court even cited “empirical 
evidence” from a summary report, prepared by the Florida Bar, 
about the public’s feelings of these types of direct-mail solicitations 
and the anger that these direct mail solicitations prompted. 142 The 
Court noted that “the harm targeted by the Bar” (the direct mail 
solicitation) “cannot be eliminated by a brief journey to the trash 
can.”143  
While not all women seeking abortions are in a fragile 
emotional state at the time of a pre-abortion ultrasound, the 
                                                
137 Id. at 620.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 624 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 8, 25–27). 
140 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 624 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-
15; Brief for Petitioner at 28-29). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 631-32, 626-27. 
143 Id. at 631. 
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circumstances and captivity in which a woman may be required to 
view the fetus, hear its heartbeat, etc. may render these messages 
emotionally intrusive.144 As in Went For It, the act of listening to 
the state’s message, as it is conveyed by the physician, may not 
simply be solved by “a brief journey to the trash can” or being 
forced to forget what one has just seen or been told. By the state’s 
design, these messages are meant to impact the woman as she makes 
(or confirms) her decision to have an abortion. The troubling nature 
of these messages may have a lasting and harmful impact.  
 
IV. SHIFTING THE DISCOURSE TOWARDS A PATIENT’S RIGHT 
NOT TO HEAR  
 
The notion of a First Amendment right against compelled 
listening has not yet been established, nor is the argument for 
establishing this right robust enough to withstand the current 
Supreme Court’s analysis.145 Still, the discourse around ultrasound 
description mandates should be actively shifted away from the First 
Amendment rights of the physician and towards developing a 
doctrine that bolsters a patient’s right not to hear. Further, this will 
have implications for the regulation of medicine and for public 
health. Ultimately, shifting the analysis from physician rights to 
patient rights is not only critical to women’s rights in the context of 
abortion care, but also essential for upholding the common-law 
doctrine of informed consent and for strengthening the continued 
role of law in protecting public health.  
 
A.  Informed Consent and the Interplay Between 
Physicians’ and Patients’ Rights 
 
One primary reason to shift the abortion rights discourse 
from a physician’s right against government-compelled speech to a 
patient’s right against compelled listening is grounded in the critical 
                                                
144 In fact, the setting in which a woman finds herself during an ultrasound 
description – in the confines of a physician’s office, with the “speaker” – and 
not in the privacy of one’s home (as is the case in Went For It) would arguably 
make the messages at-issue far more intrusive than a direct mailing. 
145 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).  
SHULMAN-LANIEL: A PATIENT’S RIGHT NOT TO HEAR: THE PUBLIC HEALTH CASE FOR CHALLENGING 
PRE-ABORTION ULTRASOUND DESCRIPTION MANDATES BY REFOCUSING ON THE LISTENER 
 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW [Vol. VII: II 
 
54 
importance of informed consent. Founded predominantly on 
notions of patient autonomy,146 informed consent typically requires 
that doctors disclose all “material risks” to a patient, applying either 
a reasonable physician standard or a reasonable person standard as 
the mechanism by which courts determine what doctors should 
consider “material.”147 While the doctor – guided, in part, by fears 
of tort liability – typically determines what specific information to 
share with a patient, under the doctrine, “the decision [to refuse 
medical interventions] belongs to the patient.148 Ideally, once armed 
with enough information, the patient can make an autonomous 
decision about his or her health care. 
 This view of informed consent, however, is rosy. While 
many scholars argue that ultrasound description mandates and other 
abortion-related informed consent requirements can, and should, be 
struck down as “fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine of 
informed consent,”149 other scholars, such as Nadia Sawicki, note 
that these laws “should [perhaps] be viewed not as anomalies, but 
rather as explicit manifestations of the sort of value judgments that 
have long been implicit in the law and doctrine of informed 
consent.”150  
For example, despite the notion that the informed consent 
doctrine was “driven in large part by a desire to combat the 
                                                
146 Vanderwalker, supra note 5, at 5. 
147 Id. (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
148 Vanderwalker, supra note 5, at 5.  
149 Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, 
Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2011) (“Scholars of law, medicine, 
and ethics argue that the new disclosure requirements are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the doctrine of informed consent, which obligates 
physicians to provide patients with sufficient information to make 
autonomous and educated decisions about their medical care.”). See also 
Sanger, supra note 16, at 403 (describing how seeing a fetal image on an 
ultrasound may “distort judgment” rather than inform it); Maya Manian, The 
Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 226 (“Abortion law invokes and then 
misuses ‘informed consent’ terminology.”).  
150 Sawicki, supra note 149, at 5.  
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paternalism of medicine,”151 the doctrine is still often critiqued as 
“too physician-centric.” 152  A patient’s autonomy interests are, 
arguably, more recognized as central to the informed consent 
doctrine today,153 but both state- and doctor-proscribed paternalism 
have long impacted and still impact what information is and is not 
shared with patients.154 By focusing solely on the physician’s rights 
against compelled speech, the public health rhetoric around 
ultrasound description mandates, while well meaning, may 
exacerbate this physician-centric view of informed consent.155 By 
refocusing on patients’ rights against compelled listening in the 
abortion context, this concern can, in part, be addressed and ensure 
                                                
151 Sonia M. Suter, The Politics of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion 
and End-of-Life Decision Making, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 15 (2013). 
152 Haupt, supra note 59, at 1288 (“There is continued debate over whether 
the current tort paradigm [around informed consent] appropriately accounts 
for patients’ interests, or whether it continues to be too physician-centric.”). 
153 See id. at 1287–88.  
154 See, e.g., id. at 1288 (“There is a troubling history of paternalism in the 
medical profession that limited the amount of information shared with 
patients.”); see also, Suter, supra note 150, at 12(“Historically, physicians 
disclosed medical information only to persuade patients to do what physicians 
thought was best for them or to try to offer hope and comfort. Indeed, 
deception in certain cases was not only acceptable, but sometimes considered 
necessary, to achieve those goals.”); Sawicki, supra note 149, at 19 (“[B]oth 
the ethical standard of informed consent, which looks to materiality of the 
information to the patient’s decision, and the legal standard, which looks to 
the standard of a reasonable patient or physician, necessarily are dependent 
on social norms and values.”).  
155 Recognizing a professional’s speech rights may, in fact, put patients and 
professionals at odds, because physicians alone will then determine what is 
relevant to a patient’s decision-making. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 59, at 
1300 (“Under the knowledge community focused theory of professional 
speech, the professional is to decide what is relevant professional information. 
The knowledge community’s insights not only determine what accurate 
information is, but also what is relevant in any given situation according to 
the specific circumstances of the client.”). While this cannot always be 
avoided, given the asymmetry of knowledge in a doctor-patient relationship, 
it is worth striving for doctor-patient dialogue that is predominantly driven by 
the patient’s ability to ask for information and to refuse doctor-provided 
information.   
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that a patient-focused doctrine of informed consent is more able to 
emerge.  
Moreover, despite many advocates’ concerns that abortion-
related informed consent requirements are too politicized or 
intervene too greatly in the doctor-patient relationship,156 informed 
consent laws will never be value-neutral157 and striving for a non-
interventionist, value-neutral informed consent doctrine should not 
be the goal. In fact, by focusing the discussion of ultrasound 
description mandates on establishing a physician’s right not to be 
compelled to be the state’s mouthpiece, the public health legal 
community may set a dangerous precedent that greatly restricts the 
government’s ability to compel physician speech, speech that is 
often essential for promoting patient autonomy in medical decision-
making and in protecting informed consent. 158  “Ordinarily, the 
doctrines of free speech and informed consent coexist without much 
difficulty.”159 Yet, by putting a physician’s common law duty to 
                                                
156 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 15, at 1357 (describing how “[t]he politicization 
of professional speech undermines not just individual client trust and 
confidence, but to some extent the very notion of professionalism itself.”).  
157  See Sawicki, supra note 149, at 19 (“[E]ven the normative view of 
informed consent as an ethical ideal recognizes that neutrality, objectivity, 
and impartiality are often impossible, and sometimes unwarranted.”).  
158 Moreover, the state sometimes does have a substantial interest in barring 
professional speech. In Doe, for example, the court found the evidence that 
SOCE counseling is “ineffective or harmful” compelling towards its 
reasoning that the state had a substantial interest in protecting potential 
patients.  Doe, 783 F.3d 150 at 153(citing King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 
216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014)). If, then, the state itself has a right to bar speech to 
protect patients, why shouldn’t the patient also have the same right to bar 
speech? Even though ultrasound description mandates are most often 
discussed in the context of “compelled” professional speech, ultrasound 
description mandates, too, can be considered as a question of when and by 
whom a professional’s speech can be prohibited. A First Amendment right 
against compelled listening is, in a sense, a right for patients to themselves 
restrict the speech of professionals; speech that may be, at best, “ineffective” 
and, at worst, “harmful” to patients. 
159 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech 2 
(Ind. Univ. Robert H. McKinney Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 2014-31, 
2014). 
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obtain informed consent from patients and a physician’s First 
Amendment rights in tension, we create a conflict for public health 
that may undermine decades of legal precedent to protect patients 
who, almost invariably, have less information about a procedure 
than their physicians.160  
 
B. The Negative Implications of Focusing on Physicians’ 
First Amendment Rights 
 
The “regulation of medicine has long been recognized as 
within the state’s police powers” and medical practices are a 
common venue through which populations interact with a state’s 
public health systems. 161  From preventing gun injuries in 
households with children to advancing vaccination campaigns, 
regulating physician speech and promoting strong informed consent 
policies must continue to be an important tool for regulating the 
practice of medicine and for advancing public health. The public 
health community wants, at times, to require doctors to advance the 
state’s interests in order to protect patients.162 We want, at times, for 
the government to dictate that a physician should offer to a patient 
information that may be material to her decision-making.163 Setting 
                                                
160 See id. at 1.  
161 Suter, supra note 5, at 22 (citing Post, supra note 5, at 950). 
162 For example, in the case of promoting widespread vaccination, the public 
health community often argues that medical professionals should be required 
to provide detailed information about the risks of not vaccinating one’s 
children to parents hesitant about or refusing the recommended vaccination 
schedule. See, e.g., Kristin S. Hendrix, et al., Ethics and Childhood 
Vaccination Policy in the United States, 106 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 273, 276 
(describing how “the documented difficulty of communicating with vaccine-
hesitant and vaccine-opposing families” may warrant “making the informed-
consent process more educationally intensive and applicable not only to 
parents choosing to immunize their children but also, and especially, to those 
refusing or declining immunizations or requesting a modified schedule.”).   
163  See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (1980) (holding that a 
physician breached his duty of care when the doctor failed to inform a patient 
of the potentially fatal consequences of declining a pap smear.). We also want 
the patient to ultimately be able to dictate when the physician’s speech should 
stop or when the speech is no longer material to her decision-making. See 
infra notes 171, 177 and accompanying text. 
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a precedent that compelling physician speech is not within the scope 
of these police powers may, therefore, have dangerous implications 
for how the state can advance its interest in public health through its 
regulation of the medical profession in the future.   
By refocusing on the patient’s right against compelled 
listening, it becomes clear that the state’s use of informed consent 
and the patient’s own rights need not be at odds. In fact, the state’s 
use of informed consent can strengthen the unique interplay of 
physician-patient relationship. As First Amendment scholar Paula 
Berg notes in an article about informed consent, “government 
regulation of doctor-patient speech may in some cases be necessary 
to increase the flow of information to patients, thereby facilitating 
the attainment of consent and thus advancing the First Amendment 
goals of self-fulfillment and autonomy.”164 As described in Part I of 
this article, by their very nature, informed consent laws can help to 
correct the power imbalance inherent between a physician (and their 
“knowledge community”) and a patient. 165  “States are rightly 
concerned about the asymmetries of power and information that 
inhere in professional client relationships.”166 When the patient is 
central to the informed consent doctrine, informed consent laws can 
help to fundamentally correct for these concerns.  
Ultimately, if we begin to ground the discussion around 
abortion-specific informed consent laws in a patient’s right not to 
hear, the First Amendment can advance in conformity with the goals 
of informed consent and can, in fact, strengthen the informed 
consent doctrine. Even with the recognition that informed consent 
laws are inherently paternalistic, when looked at from the 
perspective of the patient’s right not to listen, abortion-specific 
informed consent requirements, in general  – and ultrasound 
description mandates, in particular – run afoul of informed 
consent’s doctrinal goals.167 As many scholars have noted, “[t]he 
                                                
164 Berg, supra note 57, at 206.  
165 Zick, supra note 15, at 1352. 
166 Id.  
167 See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 2. See also Sanger, supra note 16, 
at 378 (“Although couched in the protective terms of informed consent, these 
statutes are unabashedly meant to transform the embryo or fetus from an 
abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting mother.”); Rachel 
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Supreme Court has allowed a degree of paternalism to permeate 
informed consent doctrine for abortions even though this is absent 
in traditional informed consent and prohibited in other speech 
cases.”168 By compelling listening, ultrasound description mandates 
“[interfere] with the decision-making process by not allowing adults 
to choose what information to consider in developing their thoughts 
and making up their minds.”169 The mandates also “[force]  . . .  
information onto unwilling listeners . . . [potentially] unduly 
[influencing] the ultimate decision made.”170  
By refocusing on the patient’s rights as listener, the rhetoric 
regarding ultrasound description mandates can also acknowledge 
the essential importance of the physician-patient relationship,171 
and the value that patients can bring to this relationship, while still 
maintaining informed consent. In recognizing a patient’s right not 
                                                
Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the 
Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 
6, (2007) (“[T]he use of the informed consent process in this way clearly runs 
counter to fundamental ethical principles that have long guided the practice 
of medicine.”). 
168  Camburn, supra note 49, at 311–312 (citing Dale Carpenter, The 
Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
579, 633 (2004) (emphasis added)). See also Suter, supra note 5, at 27 (noting 
that “[i]n fact, informed consent doctrine emerged to ensure that patients 
could overcome the paternalism of medicine when physicians alone decided 
on behalf of the patient what the patient needed to know.”). 
169 Corbin, supra note 7, at 982. 
170  Id; see also Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-
Scripted Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP. 21, 21 (2009) (“The twin tenets of voluntariness [on the patient’s part] 
and adequate disclosure [by the physician] are not independent silos, but 
rather mutually dependent fundamentals for the exercise of individual choice. 
The selection of data to be shared, the values that frame the facts, and the 
emotional perspective by which they are proffered all contribute to a context 
that either animates or degrades a person’s autonomy.”).  
171  Zita Lazzarini, South Dakota’s Abortion Script — Threatening the 
Physician–Patient Relationship, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008) 
(discussing South Dakota’s informed consent abortion script, writing that the 
state’s “script also threatens the physician patient relationship in ways that 
may resonate far beyond the issue of abortion. Patients have a right to expect 
that physicians will provide them with accurate and complete medical 
information that will guide them in making medical decisions.”).  
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to hear, patients – guided, in part, by their doctors – can assess what 
information is “material” to their decision-making, without being 
subjected to speech that they deem harmful or immaterial.172 If the 
discourse is shifted to patients, a woman who decides that the 
description of an ultrasound is irrelevant to her abortion decision 
can autonomously choose not to hear and not be required by the 
                                                
172 Following Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (1980), there is a great deal 
of case law discussing the implications for informed consent doctrine of a 
patient refusing treatment. However, I am aware of no case on-point in which 
a court found that informed consent explicitly requires that a physician tell a 
patient something that the physician believes is material to the patient’s 
decision-making even after the patient makes clear their explicit desire not to 
hear. Further, in the absence of law requiring specific informed consent 
disclosures, the American Medical Association and the American Congress 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists both guide physicians with the notion that 
patients should be allowed to refuse material information and to determine 
the “quantity and specificity” of the information communicated by a 
physician. Amer. Med. Ass’n, Opinion 8.08 – Informed Consent, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion808.page? (last visited Feb. 25, 2016); see also Amer. 
Cong. on Obstetrics & Gynecology, ACOG Committee Opinion on Informed 
Consent (reaffirmed 2015), available at http://www.acog.org/Resources-
And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Informed-
Consent (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).  
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state to do so.173 Patients themselves can guide the disclosure174 and 
be treated by the law as “capable of making their own decisions” 
regarding whether to undergo this medical procedure.175 While the 
physician may need to carefully navigate the initial discussion with 
a patient to determine what information she considers 
relevant/irrelevant, women should ultimately determine for 
themselves what they want to hear. 176  In contrast, if the state 
continues to compel listening, the state, in effect, “removes 
decision-making authority from the individual” and, with it, the 
patient’s autonomy.177 As Carol Sanger writes, “Women understand 
that abortion terminates pregnancy and that some form of life . . . is 
extinguished by virtue of the procedure; that is its very point. But . 
                                                
173 Many women may, in fact, voluntarily choose to view an ultrasound prior 
to making an abortion decision. See Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 16 (“More 
studies are needed to inform the question, but the data to date suggest that it 
makes sense for physicians to offer women the opportunity to view their 
ultrasounds when they are having ultrasounds performed. A substantial 
minority, if not a majority, of women want to view the ultrasound, the viewing 
is generally a positive experience, and for a small number of women who are 
uncertain whether to have an abortion, the ultrasound may influence their 
thinking.”). The same woman may still be given pamphlets or be asked to 
sign informed consent documents that advance the government’s message in 
ways that she does not want to read, but as she is less captive in this scenario 
and not subject to professional speech within the trusting bonds of a 
physician-patient relationship, these types of government messages may 
continue to be constitutionally valid even if a right against compelled listening 
is further established. 
174 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 5, at 27. These laws currently “demand[] the 
communication of irrelevant information toward an arguably nonscientific 
ideological end (dissuading women from obtaining an otherwise legal 
professional service).” Haupt, supra note 59, at 1299. 
175 Manian, supra note 149, at 224.  
176 Sawicki, supra note 149, at 34–35 (“The challenge is finding a way to 
explain to a patient what information is available to her without running afoul 
of her right to refuse information, but this challenge is resolvable. One way 
of resolving this would be to begin the informed consent discussion by asking 
the patient what information she considers relevant and what information she 
would prefer not to hear— although this approach, applied in the abortion 
context exclusively, again runs the risk of buying into assumptions about 
women’s emotional vulnerability.”).  
177 Strauss, supra note 110, at 108–09.  
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. . mandatory ultrasound[s] improperly burden[] the ability of 
women to make decisions about abortion . . . . It is harassment 
masquerading as knowledge.”178  
By shifting to a patient-focused approach, we can better 
promote the continued empowerment of patients in their health care 
decision-making, while still holding open the door for public health 
law to advance population health by ensuring that patients have 
available to them information that may be material to their needs. 
Vesting the First Amendment analysis in the patient’s right against 
compelled listening would do precisely this. The state has a 
profound role in continuing to regulate and shape informed consent, 
“but only to the extent that it promotes, as opposed to hinders, 
informed decision making.” 179  By grounding abortion informed 
consent analysis in the patient’s right not to hear, the public health 
law community can better reach the “aspirational goal for informed 
consent” of “[basing] disclosure on both the physician’s expertise 
and knowledge of the patient’s condition and the patient’s 
preference for information and how it is dispensed, all of which is 
clarified in an individualized dialogue between the two.” 180 
Establishing that the patient has control over what she hears and 
what she refuses to hear allows for strong protections concerning 
the principles and procedures of informed consent, while also 
serving the goals of promoting autonomy in medical decision-
making, of preserving the integrity of the physician-patient 
relationship (a relationship that is strained when the government 
compels the physician to speak and the patient cannot refuse to 
                                                
178 Sanger, supra note 16, at 360 (describing the supposed “health” of the fetus 
that a woman has chosen to abort obscures the relevant medical questions 
relating to the procedure itself and its outcomes). If informed consent is to be 
driven by information that may be medically relevant, ultrasound description 
mandates are by their very nature, not medically relevant.  
179 Suter, supra note 5, at 31. 
180 Id. at 27.  
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listen),181 and of allowing the state to further protect and advance 
public health.182  
 
C. Limitations 
 
As described throughout, the courts have yet to build a firm 
doctrine that establishes a patient’s right not to hear that would both 
bolster patient autonomy and strengthen public health. While the 
rhetoric of the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger provides for some 
recognition of this right, it does so dangerously; instead of 
recognizing a right for the patient to refuse to listen, it prohibits the 
patient from ever having the opportunity to reject or request 
professional speech. Wollschlaeger’s understanding of a patient’s 
rights, therefore, continues to undermine the ability of the state to 
regulate public health, while also undermining patient’s autonomy 
and access to potentially essential information.  
Moreover, applying the captive audience doctrine to 
abortion informed consent laws raises additional questions of how 
states can continue to regulate the physician-patient relationship if 
all patients are “captive” as soon as they don a hospital gown or 
close the doctor’s office door. However, “[t]he right against 
compelled listening does not preclude the government from 
advocating policy positions or launching public education 
campaigns . . . only when there is captivity.”183 The government has 
a myriad of ways to share its message, 184  including through a 
physician, so long as the speech can readily be avoided or refused 
by the listener. Yet, by forcing physicians to hold the listener 
captive (in the ultrasound description context), the state goes above 
                                                
181 The court in Stuart recognizes this by its comment: “She must endure the 
embarrassing spectacle of averting her eyes and covering her ears while her 
physician—a person to whom she should be encouraged to listen—recites 
information to her.” Stuart, 774 F.3d at 253.  
182 As Sawicki notes, even in the context of abortion, the state’s purported 
interest in the health of the fetus and of the mother can still be advanced in 
the context of informed consent, if not within the context of the doctor-patient 
relationship. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
183 Corbin, supra note 7, at 980. 
184 Id.  
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and beyond the paternalism arguably inherent in public health law, 
violating the underpinnings of informed consent.185 
Similarly, as critical as it may be for patients to have the 
ultimate say in what is or is not material to their healthcare decision-
making, there may, in fact, be instances in which a patient should 
not be given the opportunity to reject critical medical information. 
For example, if one is about to undergo an elective medical 
procedure that carries a high risk of death, would it suffice for the 
state to merely offer this information through pamphlets and forms, 
or should the state instead require that all patients be told by their 
physicians of this risk, with no opt-out provision for the speech? It 
is possible that there is a threshold beyond which the right against 
compelled listening should not exist. In establishing this threshold, 
anti-abortion activists may argue that the information provided in 
ultrasound mandates serves such a substantial state interest in the 
life of the fetus that the information provided to a patient should be 
mandatorily received. Ultimately, a doctrinal test of the listener’s 
rights would help to distinguish between instances where patients 
have full autonomy in their listening and instances where the 
information provided is so critical as to trump the patients’ right 
against compelled listening. As the doctrine and scholarly rhetoric 
on this issue develop, this will remain an essential question.  
Moreover, while many of the arguments supporting a right 
against compelling listening come from a concern about “the state’s 
                                                
185 As Nadia Sawicki writes, “some of the information currently required by 
abortion disclosure statutes need not be conveyed by the physician directly 
but may instead be communicated (as often occurs) in the form of a state 
pamphlet. To the extent that abortion disclosure laws require conveyance of 
non-medical information, such laws would be more consistent with informed 
consent doctrine if the state, rather than the physician, were to make the 
disclosures . . . it must be emphasized that introducing the state’s 
communicative message at this particular time and place can only be defended 
as a matter of convenience—and not because state speech is relevant to, 
analogous to, or part of the informed consent dialogue between physician and 
patient.”). Sawicki, supra note 149, at 32. 
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reliance on emotion to persuade,”186 the use of compelled emotion 
is often an important and effective tool that may continue to need a 
place in public health law and communications. From Smokey the 
Bear to anti-tobacco campaigns, the government often uses imagery 
to speak;187 in many contexts, shocking images may be the most 
effective method to promote public health. 188  Reconciling the 
contexts in which emotional imagery may create more harm than 
good may be a critical part of future analysis.189 A woman, in the 
captive setting of the exam room, should not be required to listen to 
the emotionally unsettling messages that ultrasound descriptions 
require,190 just as a smoker encountering the emotionally startling 
warnings on a cigarette pack is not required to read them. While 
there may seem to be an inherent tension between the effectiveness 
of emotional public health messaging and the rights of the listener, 
by establishing a right to refuse to hear these emotional messages, 
this tension may also be reconciled, while still allowing the public 
health community to attempt to expose listeners to – but not force 
                                                
186 Nadia Sawicki, Compelling Images: The Constitutionality of Emotionally 
Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458, 458 (2014) [hereinafter 
Compelling Images]. 
187 Id. at 459.  
188 See, e.g., id. at 460 (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and 
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,674 (June 22, 2011)) (“Notably, the 
FDA selected these images precisely because of their emotional impact, citing 
evidence that ‘messages that arouse emotional reactions’ or ‘generate an 
immediate emotional response’ are more likely to trigger behavioral 
changes.”).  
189 See generally, Compelling Images, supra note 186, at 460.   
190 Under the current First Amendment doctrine allowing for “truthful,” “non-
misleading” messages, even “’truthful’ information” such as that at-issue 
during an ultrasound “may nevertheless be misleading when it takes 
advantage of individuals’ likelihood to be inappropriately persuaded by 
emotional biases. That is, empirical research demonstrates that individuals 
tend to be more easily persuaded when in a fearful or anxious emotional state-
the emotional state most likely to be elicited by the information provided.” 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of 
Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 36 (2008). But see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the required 
disclosures associated with an ultrasound description law represented “the 
epitome of truthful, non-misleading information”).   
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upon captive listeners – emotional messages that seek to advance 
population health.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
As discussed, ultrasound description mandates are at odds 
with the purported goal of promoting patient autonomy. However, 
continued attempts to dismantle these regulations by focusing on a 
physician’s First Amendment right against compelled speech may 
have dangerous implications for the regulation of medicine and for 
public health more broadly. Instead, by establishing a patient’s First 
Amendment right not to hear, the public health legal community can 
strike a balance that continues to allow for broad promotion and 
regulation of the physician-patient relationship, while also 
respecting and enhancing patient autonomy. By continuing to allow 
physicians to speak and to communicate the government’s interests 
in protecting health, but also by insisting that patients be allowed to 
refuse to listen and to determine what information may be material 
to their decision-making, we can lift the “informed consent” veil 
that protects pre-abortion ultrasound description mandates. In its 
place, by establishing a patient’s right not to hear, we can enhance 
patients’ rights by re-building a patient-centric view of informed 
consent, giving patients the ability to avoid unwanted speech, and 
allowing for the continuing strength of the state’s role in promoting 
public health.   	
